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Abstract:  
A commonly held view is that nominal rigidities are important for the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks. We argue that they are also important for understanding the 
dynamic effects of technology shocks, especially on labor hours, wages, and prices. 
Based on a dynamic general equilibrium framework, our closed-form solutions reveal 
that a pure sticky-price model predicts correctly that hours decline following a positive 
technology shock, but fails to generate the observed gradual rise in the real wage and 
the near-constance of the nominal wage; a pure sticky-wage model does well in 
generating slow adjustments in the nominal wage, but it does not generate plausible 
dynamics of hours and the real wage. A model with both types of nominal rigidities is 
more successful in replicating the empirical evidence about hours, wages and prices. 
This finding is robust for a wide range of parameter values, including a relatively small 
Frisch elasticity of hours and a relatively high frequency of price reoptimization that are 
consistent with microeconomic evidence. 
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1 Introduction
A common view holds that nominal rigidities such as sticky prices and sticky wages are important
for the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We argue that nominal rigidities are also important
for understanding the dynamic effects of technology shocks. In particular, we show that sticky prices
and sticky nominal wages are important for generating the observed effects of technology shocks on
hours, wages, and prices documented, for example, by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (BFK, 2006).
In a provocative study, Gal´ı (1999) reports that, in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
model, a positive technology shock leads to a short-run decline in hours worked. He then argues
that this evidence presents a challenge to the standard real business cycle (RBC) model, while being
consistent with the predictions from a DSGE model with sticky prices and weak accommodation
of monetary policy to the technology shock.1 BFK (2006) provide corroborating evidence about
the contractionary effects of technology shocks on hours based on an independent measure of
technology. They construct a “purified” Solow residual by controlling for non-technological factors
such as variable input utilization rates, non-constant returns, and imperfect competition and find
that hours decline following a positive technology shock. They also argue that their evidence favors
a sticky-price model.2
To explain the observed decline in hours, however, does not necessarily require nominal rigidities.
For example, Francis and Ramey (2005) argue that the standard RBC model augmented with
habit formation and investment adjustment costs is able to generate slow adjustments in aggregate
output and therefore a decline in hours following a positive technology shock. Thus, based on
the dynamic adjustments of hours alone, one would not be able to distinguish between the role of
nominal rigidities (such as sticky prices) and the role of real rigidities (such as habit formation and
investment adjustment costs) in transmitting technology shocks. We argue that, to better assess
the empirical relevance of each type of frictions, it is essential to examine a broad set of labor
market dynamics, including wages and prices, not just hours.
The study by BFK (2006) provides direct evidence on the adjustments of wages and prices
following technology shocks. Figure 1 replicates the BFK (2006) results and reports the adjustments
1Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2004) find that, if hours enter the SVAR in levels rather than in first
differences, then the response of hours to a technology shock becomes positive. Fernald (2007) offers a plausible
reconciliation between these apparently conflicting results. He points out that, when the trend breaks in productivity
and hours are taken into account, the response of hours to a technology shock is negative regardless of whether hours
enter the SVAR in levels or in first differences.
2The idea that sticky prices help explain the decline in hours (or the rise in unemployment) following a positive
technology shock has been recognized at least since Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Blanchard (1989): as productivity
rises, sticky prices prevent output from rising as much so that hours decline.
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of labor-market variables, including hours, the real wage, the nominal wage, and the price level
following the BFK measure of the technology shock.3 The figure shows that a positive technology
shock leads to a modest rise in the real wage on impact, which continues rising before reaching
a permanently higher level. The adjustments of the real wage are driven almost entirely by the
adjustments of the price level as the nominal wage remains almost flat following the shock while
the price level declines modestly on impact and continues declining for about a year until reaching
a permanent lower level. The issue that we address in the current paper is then: Are nominal
rigidities necessary to understand the dynamic behaviors of hours, wages, and prices following a
technology shock?
To answer this question, we extend Gali’s (1999) sticky-price model in two directions. First,
based on the evidence that nominal wages are almost unresponsive to technology shocks, we intro-
duce nominal wage rigidity by assuming imperfectly competitive households with respect to labor
skills and nominal wage contracts a` la Calvo (1983). Second, we consider a range of Frisch elas-
ticity of hours and we show that this parameter plays a key role in determining the equilibrium
responses of hours and the real wage to a technology shock. Following Gal´ı, we assume imperfectly
competitive price-setting firms and a monetary authority that adjusts the growth rate of money
supply in response to changes in productivity shocks. We abstract from capital accumulation to
focus on closed-form solutions. Our analytical approach allows a transparent and comprehensive
reading of the mechanisms at work in generating our main findings.
We gradually build intuition about the role played by the structural ingredients of our general
framework. First, we examine a model that features sticky prices only. This model is broadly
similar to the one solved and analyzed by Gal´ı (1999), except that our model features Calvo (1983)
price contracts while Gal´ı (1999) focuses on pre-determined prices. Our closed-from solution reveals
that a technology improvement consistently leads to a short-run decline in hours. To the extent
that money supply increases by less than one-for-one when technology improves, this result is not
sensitive to variations in the elasticity of labor supply or the accommodativeness of monetary policy.
Thus, Gali’s (1999) finding that a sticky-price model helps generate the contractionary effects of
technology shock on hours is quite robust.
Nonetheless, the sticky-price model also predicts that the response of the real wage to a tech-
nology shock can be ambiguous and the sign of the initial adjustment depends on the model’s
parameter values. In particular, if the Frisch elasticity of hours is low and monetary policy accom-
modation to the shock is weak, the positive technology shock can lead to an initial decline in the
3We are grateful to John Fernald for providing the source materials for replicating the figure.
3
real wage along with hours. Essentially, with sticky prices and weak monetary policy accommoda-
tion, the initial adjustments in consumption, and thus in the marginal utility of consumption are
small; as hours decline and leisure rises, the marginal utility of leisure falls. Thus, the marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and consumption falls on impact, and so does the real wage. The
smaller the Frisch elasticity, the greater the decline in the real wage required to be consistent with
the decline in equilibrium hours. With staggered price contracts, the price level declines modestly
on impact, so that the initial decline in the real wage implies an even larger initial decline in the
nominal wage. These patterns of adjustments in the real and nominal wages are not supported by
the empirical evidence.
To generate the observed modest rise in the real wage in the sticky-price model requires a high
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and a strong degree of monetary policy accommodation. However,
neither seems empirically plausible. Microeconomic studies on labor supply suggest that the Frisch
elasticity is small (e.g., Pencavel, 1986), so the first condition seems unlikely to be met. Regarding
the second condition, we provide evidence based on an examination of the relation between the
U.S. money aggregates (M1 and M2) and several alternative measures of technology shocks which
shows that the degree of monetary policy accommodation is at best very weak. On this ground,
we conclude that the sticky-price channel, by itself, cannot generate plausible dynamics of the real
and nominal wages driven by technology shocks.
In light of the sluggish adjustments of the nominal wage observed empirically, we next examine
the transmission mechanism of technology shocks in a sticky-wage model. With sticky wages as
the only source of nominal rigidities, we find that the nominal wage remains roughly constant and
the real wage rises on impact of the technology shock, representing a step in the right direction
relative to the sticky-price model. Nonetheless, a pure sticky-wage model does not predict a decline
in hours worked. Since prices are flexible, the technology shock leads to a one-for-one decline in the
price level and, in the absence of monetary policy accommodation (i.e., constant money supply), a
one-for-one increase in output with the productivity so that hours stay constant; if the monetary
policy is partially accommodative to the shock, money supply will increase and output will rise even
further so that hours will rise. Thus, regardless of the extent of monetary policy accommodation,
the pure sticky-wage model does not predict a fall in hours.
Bringing together nominal price and nominal wage rigidities helps generate plausible dynamics
for wages, prices, as well as hours following technology shocks. The inability of a pure sticky-price
model to generate a weak response of the nominal wage is amended by allowing some nominal
wage rigidity; the inability of a pure sticky-wage model to generate the observed decline in hours
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is overcome by introducing some nominal price rigidity. Even with relatively frequent price re-
optimizations suggested by microeconomic studies (e.g., Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)), the model’s predicted labor market re-
sponses to technology shocks remain consistent with the empirical evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a DSGE model with sticky
prices. There, we derive closed-form solutions and assesses the plausibility of the sticky-price
model to match BFK’s evidence on hours, wages, and prices. We also present evidence on the
extent of monetary policy accommodation to technology shocks. Section 3 examines the role of
sticky nominal wages in the transmission of technology shocks. We begin with a pure sticky-wage
model to illustrate the mechanism and then assesses the ability of the model with both sticky
prices and sticky wages in replicating the empirical evidence provided by BFK (2006). Section 4
concludes.
2 The Transmission of Technology Shocks in the Sticky-Price Model
This section presents a stylized monetary business-cycle model with sticky prices and examine the
model’s predicted effects of technology shocks on hours, the nominal wage, the real wage, and the
price level.
2.1 The Model Economy
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, infinitely-lived households, and a large
number of firms, each producing a differentiated product. The representative household is endowed
with one unit of time and derives utility from consumption, real money balances, and leisure time.
The consumption good is a composite of the differentiated products. Production of each type of
differentiated good requires labor as the only input and is subject to a productivity shock. While
the labor market is perfectly competitive, the goods market is monopolistically competitive. Firms’
pricing decisions are staggered in the spirit of Calvo (1983), although our main results do not hinge
upon this specific form of price rigidity.
2.1.1 The Representative Household
The representative household has preferences defined by the following utility function:
E
∞∑
t=0
βt[logCt +Φ log
Mt
Pt
− V (Nt)], (1)
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where E is an expectations operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct denotes consump-
tion, Mt/Pt denotes real money balances, and Nt denotes labor hours.
In each period t, the household faces a budget constraint
PtCt +Mt + EtDt,t+1Bt+1 ≤WtNt +Πt +Mt−1 +Bt − Tt, (2)
where Pt is the price level, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Πt is a claim to all firms’ profits, and Tt is a
lump-sum tax. The term Bt+1 denotes the holdings of a one-period state-contingent nominal bond
that pays one unit of currency in period t+1 if a particular event is realized, Dt,t+1 is the period-t
price of such a bond divided by the probability of the appropriate state, so that EtDt,t+1Bt+1 is
the total cost of state-contingent bonds.
The consumption basket is given by
Ct =
[∫
1
0
Yt(j)
εp−1
εp dj
] εp
εp−1
, (3)
where Yt(j) denotes the output of type-j good and εp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated products. The household’s expenditure-minimization problem results in a demand
schedule for a type-j good:
Y dt (j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)
−εp
Ct, (4)
where Pt(j) denotes the price of good j, and the price level Pt is related to individual prices through
Pt =
[∫
1
0
Pt(j)
1−εpdj
] 1
1−εp .
Solving the household’s utility-maximization problem results in a labor supply equation, an
intertemporal Euler equation, and a money demand equation, given respectively by
Wt
Pt
= V ′(Nt)Ct, (5)
Dt,τ = β
τ−t Ct
Cτ
P t
Pτ
, (6)
and
Φ
1
Mt
+ βEt
1
Pt+1Ct+1
=
1
PtCt
. (7)
2.1.2 Firms and Optimal Price-Setting
A good of type j ∈ [0, 1] is produced using labor as the input, with a production function given by
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), (8)
where At denotes a productivity shock that is common to all firms, and Nt(j) is the homogeneous
labor used by firm j. The shock follows a random-walk process so that
At = At−1exp(εt), (9)
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where εt is a mean-zero, iid normal process, with a finite variance σ
2
a.
Firms are price-takers in the input markets and monopolistic competitors in the product mar-
kets. They set prices in a staggered fashion in the spirit of Calvo (1983). In particular, in period t,
all firms receive an iid random signal that determines whether or not they can set a new price. The
probability that firms can adjust prices is 1− αp. By the law of large numbers, a fraction 1 − αp
of firms can set new prices in any given period.
If firm j can set a new price in period t, it chooses a price Pt(j) to maximize an expected present
value of its profits
Et
∞∑
τ=t
ατ−tp Dt,τ [Pt(j) − Vτ ]Y
d
τ (j), (10)
where Vτ =Wτ/Aτ is the unit production cost, and Y
d
τ (j) is the demand schedule described in (4).
Solving the profit maximizing problem results in an optimal pricing decision rule
P ∗t (j) = µp
Et
∑
∞
τ=t α
τ−t
p Dt,τVτY
d
τ (j)
Et
∑
∞
τ=t α
τ−t
p Dt,τY dτ (j)
, (11)
where µp = εp/(εp − 1) measures the steady-state markup. The optimal price is thus a markup
over a weighted average of the marginal costs in the current and future periods during which the
price is expected to remain in effect.
Solving the cost-minimizing problem of firm j yields the demand for labor Ndt (j) = Y
d
t (j)/At.
The aggregate demand for labor is then given by
Ndt =
1
At
∫
1
0
Y dt (j)dj =
GtCt
At
, (12)
where Gt =
∫
1
0
[Pt(j)/Pt]
−εpdj measures price dispersion. Thus, if the rise in aggregate demand
cannot catch up with productivity improvement, the aggregate demand for labor would fall.
2.1.3 Monetary Policy
Following Gal´ı (1999), we assume that the monetary authority is allowed, but not required to
adjust the growth rate of money stock in response to changes in productivity shocks. Specifically,
we assume
µt = (1− ρ)µ¯+ ρµt−1 + γεt, (13)
where µt = log(M
s
t /M
s
t−1) denotes the growth rate of money supply, µ¯ is the mean money growth,
and γ 6= 0 implies a systematic response of monetary policy to technology shocks.
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2.1.4 Equilibrium
Given the monetary policy described in (13), an equilibrium consists of allocations Ct, Nt, Bt+1,
and Mt for the representative household; allocations Yt(j) and Nt(j), and price Pt(j) for producer
j ∈ [0, 1]; together with prices Dt,t+1, P¯t, and wage Wt, that satisfy the following conditions: (i)
taking the prices and the wage as given, the household’s allocations solve its utility maximizing
problem; (ii) taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, each producer’s allocations
and price solve its profit maximizing problem; and (iii) markets for bonds, money, labor, and the
composite goods clear.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms who can adjust prices in a given period
make identical pricing decisions. Thus, we do not have to keep track of the firm-specific index j
and we can write the pricing decisions as P ∗t in place of P
∗
t (j).
2.2 The Sticky-Price Channel
We now examine the sticky-price channel for the transmission of technology shocks. We examine,
both analytically and numerically the responses of hours, the real wage, and the nominal wage
following a technology shock.
2.2.1 Theoretical Properties of the Sticky-Price Model
We first examine the theoretical properties of the sticky-price model for the adjustment of hours,
the nominal wage, the real wage, and the price level following a technology shock and we assess
the plausibility of these theoretical implications in light of the empirical evidence provided by BFK
(2006). In the next subsection, we evaluate the model’s performance along these dimensions under
empirically plausible values of the parameters. For our purpose, we consider small shocks so that
the equilibrium conditions can be approximated by log-linearizing around a zero-inflation steady
state.4 Further, for analytical convenience, we set ρ = 0 in the money growth rule (13), so that
deviations of the money growth rate from its steady state level is proportional to productivity
growth. Or equivalently, given that the productivity shock follows a random walk process, so does
the money stock under the assumption that ρ = 0. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium
dynamics using a closed-form solution. We relax this assumption when we assess the quantitative
implications of the sticky-price model in the next subsection.
4Allowing for positive steady-state inflation does not change the qualitative results (not reported).
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We begin with the Phillips-curve relation obtained from log-linearizing the optimal pricing
decision rule (11)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κp(ct − c¯t), (14)
where lower-case variables denote the log-deviations of the upper-case variables from steady state,
πt = pt − pt−1 denotes the inflation rate, c¯t = at is the natural rate of output. The parameter
κp = λp(1 + η) determines the response of real marginal cost to changes in output, where η =
V ′′(N)N/V ′(N) is the inverse labor-supply elasticity and λp = (1−βαp)(1−αp)/αp is the elasticity
of pricing decisions with respect to real marginal cost. Note that κp increases with η, the inverse
labor supply elasticity. A smaller labor supply elasticity implies a larger value of η and thus a
larger κp, so that the marginal cost is more responsive to changes in aggregate demand, and there
is less endogenous nominal price rigidity.
Next, we log-linearize the intertemporal money demand decision (7) to obtain
pt + ct = (1− β)mt + βEt(pt+1 + ct+1). (15)
Under our assumption that ρ = 0 in the monetary policy rule (13), the money supply follows a
random-walk process, as does the technology shock. Then, (15) reduces to
pt + ct = (1− β)
∞∑
j=0
βjEtmt+j = mt. (16)
Note that, this apparently static aggregate demand relation is not an ad hoc assumption, but rather
an equilibrium outcome. It is obtained under the assumptions of separable period-utility function,
log-utilities in consumption and real money balances, and the random-walk property of money
stocks inherited from the technology shock process.
The system of equilibrium conditions (14) and (16), along with the monetary policy rule mt =
γat can be combined to obtain a solution for the dynamics of the price level. This is given by
pt = θppt−1 + (1− θp)(γ − 1)at. (17)
where θp is the stable root of the quadratic polynomial βθ
2− (1+β+κp)θ+1 = 0. Thus, the price
level falls on impact of a positive technology shock if and only if γ < 1. A larger θp implies greater
strategic complementarity in firms’ pricing and thus more persistence in the price (and inflation)
dynamics and a smaller response of the price level (and of inflation) to technology shocks.
Given the solution for pt, we obtain the solution for ct by using (16). It then follows from
nt = ct − at that the solution for employment is given by
nt = θpnt−1 + (γ − 1)θpεt. (18)
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Therefore, as stated by Gal´ı (1999), a technology improvement can lead to a fall in employment if
and only if γ < 1. Further, for a larger value of θp, employment becomes more persistent and, for
any given γ 6= 1, more responsive to the technology shock.
As a point of departure from Gal´ı (1999), we also examine the dynamic response of real and
nominal wages to technology shocks. Using the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain the
initial response of the real wage (denoted by ωt):
ω0 = 1− θp(1 + η)(1 − γ). (19)
The impact effect of a technology shock on the real wage is thus ambiguous, depending on the pa-
rameter values. The real wage falls on impact if monetary policy accommodation to the technology
shock is weak (i.e., γ is small), the Frisch elasticity of hours is small (i.e., η is large), or the strategic
complementarity is strong (i.e., θp is large).
Thus, in response to a positive technology shock, the stickiness in price-setting implies sluggish-
ness in output adjustment as long as γ is small. For a small value of γ, output adjustment cannot
catch up with the technology improvement, leading to a lower demand for labor at any given real
wage. The lower demand for labor puts a downward pressure on the equilibrium real wage. Since
ct rises, there is also an income effect on labor supply that tends to offset the fall in the real wage,
rendering the net effect ambiguous. Specifically, the net effect on the real wage depends on the
strength of the income effect (that depends negatively on the endogenous price stickiness measured
by θp and positively on the degree of monetary policy accommodation measured by γ) relative to
that of the substitution effect (that depends positively on the curvature coefficient of the labor
supply curve η).
For plausible parameter values, as we show below, the real wage indeed falls along with em-
ployment in the sticky-price model. As the price level falls (for γ < 1), the decline in the real wage
after the shock implies an even stronger decline in the nominal wage, making it difficult for the
sticky-price model, by itself, to explain the modest rise in the real wage on impact of the technology
shock and the weak adjustment in the nominal wage.
2.2.2 Calibration
We now assess the quantitative predictions of the sticky-price model under empirically plausible
parameter values. We first consider a set of baseline calibrated parameters, and then examine the
robustness of the results.
The parameters to be calibrated include β, the subjective discount factor; αp, the Calvo proba-
bility of price non-reoptimization; εp, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products;
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η, the inverse elasticity of labor supply; and the monetary policy parameters ρ and γ. The calibrated
values are summarized in Table 1.
Since we have a quarterly model in mind, we set β = 0.99 so that the steady state annual real
interest rate is 4 percent. We set αp = 0.75 so that the average duration of the price contracts is 4
quarters. The parameter εp determines the steady-state markup of prices over marginal cost, with
the markup given by µp = εp/(εp − 1). Recent studies by Basu and Fernald (2002) suggest that
the value-added markup, controlling for factor capacity utilization rates, is about 1.05; whereas
without any utilization correction, the value-added markup is about 1.12. Some other studies
suggest a higher value-added markup of about 1.2 (without corrections for factor utilization) (e.g.,
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Since we do not focus on variations in factor utilization, in light
of these studies, we set εp = 10 so that µp = 1.1. The parameter η corresponds to the inverse labor
supply elasticity. Most empirical studies suggest that this elasticity is small and lies well below one,
so that η is above one. We set η = 2 as a benchmark value and also consider a range of η between
1 and 5, corresponding to a labor supply elasticity in the range between 0.2 and 1, consistent with
evidence on the elasticity of labor supply obtained from micro data (e.g., Pencavel, 1986).5 For the
purpose of illustration, we set ρ = 0.6 and γ = 0 as a benchmark. In our sensitivity analysis, we
allow γ to vary in the broad range between 0 and 1.
Figure 4 plots the impulse responses of hours, the nominal wage, the real wage, and the price
level following a positive technology shock under the calibrated parameters. Evidently, both the
nominal wage and the real wage fall along with employment, and the fall in the nominal wage is
greater than that of the real wage. The fall in hours is supported by empirical evidence, but the
declines in wages, both nominal and real, are not.
Figure 4 plots the impact effects of the shock on hours, the real wage, and the nominal wage
as the policy parameter γ varies from 0 to 1 and the inverse labor supply elasticity η varies from
1 to 5. The figure reveals that the sticky-price model consistently predicts the fall in hours under
all configurations of these parameters. The impact effects on the real wage and the nominal wage
are more ambiguous. Consistent with our analytical solutions for the wage dynamics, the impact
effect tends to be more negative if γ is small or η is large. Given the smallest value of η we consider
plausible (i.e., η = 1), the sticky-price model is able to generate a rise in the real wage if γ is large
enough (above 0.3). But with large values of γ, the nominal wage also rises along with the real
wage, which is at odds with the evidence that the former does not adjust much while the latter
rises significantly following technology shocks.
5The results are robust even when we extend the lower bound of η to 0.5 (not reported).
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2.2.3 The Extent of Monetary Accommodation
Since the predictions of the sticky-price model depends on how accommodative monetary policy
is, it is important get a sense of how large γ is. That is, how accommodative was U.S. monetary
policy to technology shocks? One way to answer this question is to examine the relation between
the growth rate of a measure of U.S. money aggregates and an appropriate measure of technology
shocks. Without loss of generality, we use M2 as a measure of U.S. money aggregate, with a
sample period from 1959 to 2003 (at monthly frequency). This series is obtained from the FRED
II database published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. We use two alternative measures
of technology shocks. The first measure is constructed by Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004) with a sample
period from 1950 to 2002 (at quarterly frequency), and the second is the “purified” technology
measure constructed by BFK (2006), which has a sample period from 1949 to 1996 (at annual
frequency).6
Figure 4 presents scatter plots of M2 growth rate and the two alternative measures of technology
shocks, with appropriate data frequencies and sample periods. The plots suggest a weak correlation
between the money growth rate and the technology measures. In other words, γ is likely to be small.
To obtain a formal estimate of γ, we run an OLS regression of the M2 growth rates on the
technology shock series. In particular, we estimate the monetary policy rule specified in (13),
which, for ease of reference, is rewritten here:
µt = (1− ρ)µ¯+ ρµt−1 + γεt. (20)
Using Gal´ı-Rabanal’s technology measure, the point estimates are ρˆ = 0.61(0.06) and γˆ = 0.10(0.05),
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Using the BFK measure produces point
estimates of ρˆ = 0.60(0.14) and γˆ = 0.13(0.33). The 95 percent confidence interval for γˆ is 0 to
0.2 with Gal´ı-Rabanal’s measure, and −0.53 to 0.79 with the BFK measure. It appears that the
estimates for γ are small and may even be statistically insignificant, which provides the basis for
our baseline calibration of γ = 0.7
Going back to Figure 4, we see that even if we use the higher point estimate of γ = 0.13, the
responses of the nominal wage and the real wage are still negative for all values of η. The fall in
the nominal wage is greater than that of the real wage, and is much sharper than is the fall in
the price level. Although it can be argued that there is some empirical support for the decline in
hours, the patterns of adjustments in the nominal wage and the real wage obtained from the pure
sticky-price model are simply not supported by the evidence.
6We are grateful to Susanto Basu and Jordi Gal´ı for kindly providing us with the data.
7We have also used M1 data in the regression and obtained very similar results (not reported).
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3 Adding Nominal Wage Rigidity
The sluggish responses of the nominal wage to the technology shock suggests that nominal wage
rigidity can be important. We now introduce sticky nominal wages in the model and examine the
sticky-wage channel in the transmission of technology shocks.
We assume that the labor market, like the goods market, is monopolistically competitive. There
is a continuum of households, each endowed with a differentiated labor skill indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
with a utility function similar to (1) (with all variables in the utility function indexed by i).
Production of goods requires a composite labor as the input, and is subject to a productivity
shock. The production function is the same as in (8), with the composite labor given by
Nt =
(∫
1
0
Nt(i)
εw−1
εw di
) εw
εw−1
, (21)
where εw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated skills. Solving firms’ cost-
minimizing problem results in a demand schedule for labor skill of type i. It is given by
Ndt (i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)
−εw
Nt, (22)
where Wt(i) is the nominal wage for a type i labor skill, and Wt is the wage index that is related
to individual wages by Wt =
(∫
1
0
Wt(i)
1−εwdi
) 1
1−εw .
In each period, each household receives an iid random signal that enables it to adjust its nominal
wage with probability 1 − αw, taking the demand schedule for labor skill (22) as given. It follows
from the law of large numbers that, in each period, a fraction 1−αw of all households can set new
wages. The optimal wage decision rule is given by
W ∗t (i) = µw
Et
∑
∞
τ=t α
τ−t
w Dt,τMRSτ (i)N
d
τ (i)
Et
∑
∞
τ=t α
τ−t
w Dt,τNdτ (i)
, (23)
where µw = εw/(εw − 1) measures the steady-state wage markup, and MRS = V
′(N)C denotes
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. The optimal wage is thus a
constant markup over a weighted average of the MRS’s in the current and future periods during
which the wage is expected to remain in effect.
We focus on log-linearized equilibrium conditions around a zero-inflation steady state. In the
model with both sticky prices and sticky wages, the equilibrium conditions are summarized below:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λpω˜t, (24)
πwt = βEtπw,t+1 +
λw
1 + ηεw
[(1 + η)c˜t − ω˜t], (25)
ω˜t = ω˜t−1 + πwt − πt −∆at, (26)
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(1− β)(c˜t − m˜t) = βEt(πt+1 +∆c˜t+1), (27)
∆m˜t = µt − πt −∆at, (28)
along with the monetary policy rule (13). In these expressions, πwt = wt − wt−1 denotes the wage
inflation rate, ω˜t denotes the real-wage gap, c˜t denotes the output gap, m˜t denotes the real-balance
gap, and λw = (1 − βαw)(1 − αw)/αw is a parameter that determines the responsiveness of wage-
setting decisions to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Equations
(24) and (25) are derived from optimal price- and wage-setting decisions and are sometimes known
as the price-Phillips curve and the wage-Phillips curve, respectively. Equation (26) describes the
law of motion of the real-wage gap. Equation (27) is derived from the money demand relation.
Finally, (28) describes the law of motion of the real-balance gap.
3.1 The Sticky-Wage Channel
To examine the potential ability of the model with nominal wage rigidity in explaining BFK’s
evidence, we consider various degrees of price rigidity. We begin with the extreme case where
prices are perfectly flexible (i.e., αp = 0). In this case, the pricing decision is given by pt = wt− at,
so that the real wage rises one-for-one with the technology shock, and the real-wage gap is closed.
To help obtain the equilibrium dynamics of hours, the price level, and the nominal wage, we assume
that the monetary authority follows the money growth rule (13) and that ρ = 0.
First, since the real-wage gap is closed under flexible prices, we can rewrite the wage-Phillips
curve relation (25) as
πwt = βEtπw,t+1 + κw(ct − at). (29)
where κw = λw(1 + η)/(1 + ηεw). Using the pricing decision equation pt = wt − at, this equation
can be rewritten in terms of price inflation:
πt +∆at = βEt(πt+1 +∆at+1) + κw(ct − at).
Solving for the price level, we obtain
pt = θwpt−1 + (1− θw)(γ − 1)at − θw∆at, (30)
where θw ∈ (0, 1) is the stable root of the quadratic polynomial βθ
2− (1+β+κw)θ+1 = 0. Given
the solution for pt, we use the aggregate demand relation (16) to obtain ct, and the production
function to obtain nt. The solution for hours is given by
nt = θwnt−1 + θwγεt. (31)
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Thus, with perfectly flexible prices and sticky nominal wages, the hours response to technology
shocks is non-negative as long as γ ≥ 0.
Since the real wage rises one-for-one with productivity and the impact effect on the price level
implied by (30) is (1 − θw)γ − 1, the impact effect on the nominal wage is given by (1 − θw)γ.
Since θw < 1, the response of the nominal wage, as is that of hours, is non-negative provided that
γ ≥ 0. Further, since our evidence suggests that γ is small, the response of the nominal wage to the
technology shock is also small. This prediction from the sticky-wage model seems to be supported
by the BFK (2006) evidence.
Yet, the sticky-wage model’s predicted adjustment in the real wage does not align well with
the empirical evidence. In the data, the real wage rises modestly on impact, and continues rising
thereafter until reaching the new steady state. In the model, the real wage rises instantaneously to
the new steady state on impact of the shock. This problem occurs mainly because price adjustments
are assumed to be perfectly flexible. Moreover, the sticky-wage model fails to generate a fall in
hours when technology improves.
3.2 The Joint Implications of Sticky Wages and Sticky Prices
We now consider the more general case with some price rigidity along with the nominal wage
rigidity. In this case, the equilibrium dynamics are the solution to the system of equilibrium
conditions (24)-(28), along with the monetary policy rule (13). To solve the model, we use the
calibrated parameter described in the previous section, and calibrate two additional parameters
that are unique to nominal wage rigidity: we set αw = 0.75 so that the average duration of nominal
wage contract is four quarters, as suggested by empirical evidence (e.g., Taylor (1999)); and we set
εw = 4, so that a 1 percent rise in relative nominal wages would result in a 4 percent fall in relative
hours worked, in light of the microeconomic evidence presented by Griffin (1992, 1996) (see also
Huang and Liu (2002)). Again, we consider η = 2 and γ = 0 as a baseline calibration and examine
the sensitivity of the results as η varies in the range between 1 and 5 and γ in the range between
0 and 1. Finally, in light of the microeconomic evidence that prices are adjusted fairly frequently,
we consider a shorter price-contract duration of 2 quarters as well as the standard calibration of 4
quarters.
Figure 4 plots the impulse responses of hours, wages, and prices following a positive technology
shock, with various degrees of price rigidity. In the extreme case with flexible prices, as we have
shown analytically, hours does not change. When the average duration of price contracts is 2
quarters, hours falls. Increasing price rigidity to 4 quarters of contracts magnifies the fall in hours.
The response of the real wage stays positive as we vary the degrees of price rigidity, although the
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initial response is more dampened as the length of price contracts increases. Introducing price
rigidity makes the response of the nominal wage become negative, although the magnitude of the
nominal wage response remains quite small relative to the changes in hours and the real wage, as
observed in BFK.
In this sense, the model with nominal wage rigidity, along with some price rigidity, is more
successful than the pure sticky-price model in explaining the evidence reported in BFK, and the
required price rigidity is rather modest.
Now, how robust are these results if we consider a broader range of key parameter values?
Figure 4 plots the impact effect on hours, the real wage, and the nominal wage as η varies from 1 to
5 and γ varies from 0 to 1. For most of the parameter values, the model consistently predicts that
hours falls, the real wage rises, and the nominal wage does not change much following technology
shocks, just as the evidence says.
4 Conclusion
We have examined the role of nominal rigidities in the forms of sticky prices and sticky nomi-
nal wages in explaining the dynamic effects of technology shocks on hours as well as wages and
prices. We find that these nominal rigidities, which are commonly believed to be important for the
transmission of monetary policy shocks in the literature, are also important for the transmission
of technology shocks. Our finding illustrates the importance of nominal rigidities in shaping the
business cycle. It calls for a better understanding of the sources of these nominal rigidities in order
to understand the sources of the business cycle fluctuations.
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Table 1.
Calibrated parameter values
Preferences: η = 2, β = 0.99
Nominal contract duration: αp = 0.75, αw = 0.75
Elasticities of substitution: ǫp = 10, ǫw = 4
Money growth rule: ρ = 0.60, γ = 0
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Figure 1:—Impulse responses to the BFK technology shock. Data are annual time series from 1949
to 1996, taken from Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006).
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Figure 2:—Impulse responses of labor market variables to a positive technology shock in the sticky-
price model.
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Figure 3:—Impact effects of a positive technology shock on labor market variables in the sticky-
price model for various values of η (the Frisch elasticity of labor hours) and γ (the monetary-policy
accommodation parameter).
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Figure 4:—Money growth rate and technology shocks. The upper panel is a scatter plot of the M2
growth and the BFK (2006) technology shock (annual frequency, 1960-1996). The lower panel is a
scatter plot of the M2 growth and the Gali-Rabanal (2004) technology shock (quarterly frequency,
1960:Q1 - 2002:Q4). The solid lines are the linear fits.
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Figure 5:—Impulse responses of labor market variables to a positive technology shock in the bench-
mark model with sticky prices and nominal wages.
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Figure 6:—Impact effects of a positive technology shock on labor market variables in the benchmark
model with sticky prices and nominal wages for various values of η (the Frisch elasticity of labor
hours) and γ (the monetary-policy accommodation parameter).
